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Article 2

Examining Moral Necessity in the Kontion
n?t be
. Categorical Imperative could
the basis of
Mar kE. Horns
a law. When
o:al necessi~ is the idea that specific imperatives
bmd the actiOns of a moral agent regardless of his
or her personal goals or wishes. Contemporary ethicists have debated whether the moral system of Immanuel Kant
includes rules which do in fact bind necessarily on the moral
agent. This paper will argue that Kant's categorical imperative
does not bind necessarily. The three different formu las given for
the categorical imperative can each be used to derive different
moral rules. If varying and conflicting rules can be constructed
depending on which formula is used, then it is impossible to
know which rule, if any, binds necessarily. Thus the Kantian
deontological system, though based in reason, does not show
how moral necessity can be derived from reason. However, this
failure does not preclude the existence of moral necessity. It is
even sti ll possible that necessity could rest its foundations on
reason, though Kant has not shown that such a foundation exists.
It is important to note this failure since many modem-day Kantian ethicists argue for necessary moral rules and actions based
in reason and the categorical imperative. 1 Their arguments and
moral prescriptions must be ignored or substantially amended
if the Kantian perspective is suspect. Furthermore, a fai lure or
contradiction present in Kantian philosophy would mean that a
new, sound deontological morality would be needed.

M

In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant relies
on a foundation of a priori universal concepts to establish the
categorical imperative, which is the cornerstone of his deontologicaJ2 moral framework. 3 With this imperative, he develops a
law-conception of ethics in which adherence to a moral law determines the permissibility of an action. A person wi ll often feel
that he or she will have to do a particular action. This having to
is what Kant most wants to explain. He believes that if a law is
to hold morally "as a ground of obligation," then it "must carry
with it absolute necessity."4 He finds that a moral law based on
empirical facts could not carry with it necessity since empirical
facts do not apply identically to all rational agents. Thus his ethical system depends solely on reason.5
In attempting to explain necessity, he assumes that there actually are moral duties. He considers "duty" to be equivalent to
moral necessity. A duty is thus something that a person is bound
to do. 6 Necessity binds regardless of personal interests, since
a personal interest would represent a motive and
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these inclinations are dispensed with as morally imperti nent, only the law
and respect for the law can determine the wi ll. 7
Since there IS nothing personal about the law which binds
a person to duty, then the law
must bind all rational beings.
Kant calls this law the categorical imperative, since it binds regardless of a person's interests.
Practical rules which are not universally binding he refers to as
hypothetical imperatives, since
they depend on a person's individual interests. The substance
of the categorical imperative is
essentially "do your duty," but
Kant formulates this instruction
in various ways. The first formulation he gives is derived from
his conclusion that the law must
bind on all rational beings: "Act
only m accordance with that
maxim through which you can at
the same time will that it become
a universal law." Essentially,
this formu lation states that one
must conform any particular action to a general rule or maxim,
such as "do not lie" or "do not
steal." Whatever rule one chooses, one must act according to a
rule which could be followed by
all rational beings. If one acts
according to one's personal interests, which are not shared by
all rational beings, then not all
moral agents can act in the same
way. Since the moral law must
be able to bind on all persons,

this formulation stresses the requirement of universalizability
for all moral maxims.
Kant goes on to discuss how
the basis of the categorical imperative lies also in the rational
nature of free persons. He says
that the first formula necessitating that rational beings consider
universally the maxim of their
actions must be connected "with
the concept of the will of a rational being as such. " 8 In other
words, one must have a will capable of reason to even be able
to consider maxims in this way.
A will is essentially the ability to determine one's own actions in accordance with laws
or rules. 9 The will then becomes
Kant's basis for the second formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant states that "every
rational being exists as an end
in itself, not merely as a means
to be used by this or that will at
its discretion." 10 Essentially, because rational persons have the
ability to determine themselves,
they must not be determined by
others, since this would violate
the freedom inherent to having
a will. He says that "an end in
itself has not merely a relative
worth ... but an inner worth, that
is, dignity." 11 To treat a person
as a means to some other end
would deny that they have an
inner worth and tread upon his
or her inherent dignity. From
these ideas emerges the second formula of the categorical
imperative: "Act that you use
humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any

other, always at the same time
as an end, never merely as a
means." 12 Essentially, one must
not " use" a person to get something else, but must instead treat
every rational being with respect. This applies universally
to the actions of every rational
agent since every rational being
that an agent comes in contact
with has his or her own will and
the right to self-determination
that comes with it.

lieves that such authorship is
unnecessary. 14• 15 Kant says that
the divine will, being perfectly
good, is not determined by anything other than the law. There
is no moral "ought" imperative
on the divine will, since its volition is necessarily in accordance with the law; however,
neither does the law emanate
from the divine will. 16 Rather,
the law comes from philosophy,
or reason. 17

Kant's ethical law rests, then,
on reason, impartiality, and dignity. The further relevant question concerning the basis of his
system is who authors this law.
Kant answers:

Reason does not operate by
itself; rather, it is found exclusively in rational persons. Thus
Kant believes that a rational
agent authors the moral law for
himself or herself, rather than
having any external authority
impose the law on him or her.
If an externality were to author
the law, there would have to be
an external incentive. 18 A rule
relying on an external incentive
amounts only to a hypothetical
imperative, one that a person
will only act on if one desires
the attached incentive, rather
than a categorical imperative
that applies universally regardless of interests or desires. Thus
since the categorical imperative
cannot be authored externally, it
must be authored by one's own
reason. One legislates the law to
oneself and wills that one's actions be conformed to the law.

We see philosophy put in a
precarious position, which IS
to be firm even though there is
nothing in heaven or earth from
which it depends or on which it
is based. Here philosophy is to
manifest its purity as sustainer
of its own laws, not as herald
of laws that an implanted sense
.
. 13
[ . . .] w h1spers to It.

In this passage Kant makes
clear that, not only does the
moral law not rest on empirical or earthly facts, but it also
does not gain its authority from
a divine mandate. G. E. M. Anscom be and Alasdair Macintyre,
Though Kant articulates this
twentieth-century
detractors concept of self-legislation, he
of Kant, have argued that God does not then believe that mowould have to be the author of rality is relative. He believes
the moral law in order for it to that all agents reasoning well
bind necessarily, but Kant be- will arrive at the same con-
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elusions about the moral law. each person wou ld have some moral system cannot be derived
Rather than seeing morality as a part in interpreting the categori- from any single formula of the
matter of opinion or preference cal imperative, which forms an categorical imperative. The
dictated by personal interests, overarching template for laws, three formulas he gives for the
he views it as the equivalent of into specific rules for the com- categorical imperative can be
mathematics or logic. 19 There munity. Since everyone would used to derive different moral
is a metaphysical component be involved, each autonomous rules. Because of the possibilto morality that makes it ob- person would be able to agree ity of different rules, one canjective. 20 Just as a
not know which rule, if any,
person constructs
.. .contrary to his claim, the binds necessarily.
objective
mathAs shown above, Kant
ematical principles entire moral system cannot
believes reason places certhrough reason and be derived from any single tain constraints on what the
applies those princimoral law is, namely that
ples to arrive at re- formula of the categorical
a given edict can only be
al-world solutions, imperative.
a moral law under certain
so also does a ratioconditions: the edict must
nal person construct
be able to be followed by
objective moral principles and with the imperatives and with any rational being; any actions
apply those principles to deter- the reasoning for them; hav- following from the edict must
mine his or her actions.
ing agreed, each agent would not compromise the autonomy
Part of the reason Kant be- be able to hold himself or her- of any rational being; and the
lieves that all rational agents self accountable for adhering to edict should promote a society
will arrive at the same conclu- them. By this process of reason- in which all rational beings are
sions is that he expects them to ing through, agreeing to, and treated as autonomous ends.
reason together. He asserts the adhering to the community's However, these constraints do
"worthiness of every rational rules, Kant believes that each not tell the actual content of the
subject to be a lawgiving mem- person is "self- legislating" the moral law; they merely tell the
ber in the kingdom of ends."2 1 imperatives. He or she is bring- general form of the law.
By a "kingdom of ends," he ing the rule to bear on his or her
Moral rules outlining the spemeans a society of persons in own actions.
cific content of the law must be
which the autonomy of each
Thus, Kant builds an ethical deduced from the categorical
individual to be an end unto theory on the will and reason imperative. Kant believes that
himself or herself is uncompro- of rational agents. The moral the three forms of the categorimisingly respected. 22 In such a necessity of his system lies in cal imperative, each of which
society, no person would be un- the need for universalizable corresponds to one of the three
willingly subjected to decisions maxims and dignity-respecting conditions just mentioned,
made for him or her by anoth- actions, so that maxims can ap- are three versions of the same
er individual or by the state. ply consistently to all rational rule. Because he believes that
Rather, each person would beings and the autonomy of all all moral rules can be deduced
contribute in the community's agents remains intact. However, from the categorical imperative,
determination of which moral the discussion that follows will and he believes the three formuimperatives were necessary and show that Kant's project fails las of the imperative to be givlogically merited for bringing because , .....-----, contrary to ing the same message, he also
societal order. In other words, his claim,
the entire
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believes that all moral rules can
be wholly deduced from any
single formula. 23 In fact, he says
that one should be able to make
"a complete characterization of
all maxims" by means of any of
the three formulas. 24
His view that all three formulas are derived from reason
makes this last point essential
to his project. If it is impossible
to deduce all necessary moral
rules from any one of the three
formulas provided by reason,
then Kant has not shown how
reason can be used to support
moral necessity. If reason leads
a person to deduce two or more
viable rules for the same set
of actions, then reason has not
shown that any of the rules deduced must necessarily be followed. Showing that conflicting
rules can be deduced from different formulas , as laid out below, would show that Kant has
not established moral necessity.
There are two common interpretations of what Kant means
by "reason," especially as it
pertains to the universalizability of moral rules prescribed in
the first formula. Reason can
be seen as describing either
pure logic or practical reason.
If one takes reason as meaning
"pure logic," then saying that
a moral rule is universalizable
simply means that the results
of universalizing the rule are
logically possible. If all rational agents can actually keep the
rule simultaneously, then it is
universalizable. For example,

under this interpretation the first
formula would indicate that a
maxim calling for slavery is
not universalizable. Slavery requires that there be both slaves
and slave-owners. It is not logically possible for all persons to
be enslaved, since such a situation would not allow for the existence of slave-owners.
The exerctse above shows
that one can deduce a maxim
against slavery from the first
formula of the imperative. It is
also evident that the same maxim can be deduced from the second and third formulas. Slavery
by definition does not respect
the autonomy of the slave, and
it does not allow for a society in
which all people are treated as
ends-in-themselves. Thus slavery is addressed consistently by
all three formulas of the rule.
One knows what rule to follow
concerntng slavery smce the
categorical imperative only allows for one rule.
However, not all moral rules
can be deduced consistently
from the various formulas when
one interprets reason to mean
"pure logic." For example, Kant
believes that making a false
promise is an immoral action,
and he shows from the second
formula how the categorical imperative prohibits this action. 25
It is easy to see how such a prohibition can be derived from the
formula concerning rational autonomy. Making a false promise
would prevent a rational being
from being able to
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make an informed decision.
However, a world in which
everyone makes false promises
is not a logical impossibility,
but merely inconvenient. One
can readily imagine a world in
which no one believes promises
because all promises may be
false. Thus, if one interprets reason to mean purely logic, then a
prohibition against false promises cannot be derived from the
first formula concernmg the
universalizability of maxims.
Alternatively, if one interprets " reason" to be referring
to practical reason, one is able
to derive the prohibition against
false promises from the first
formula of the categorical imperative. It would not be reasonable for false promises to be
universally allowable. No one
would ever believe any promises made, even if the person
making the promise intended to
keep it. People would eventually stop making promises altogether, which would certainly not be a practical situation.
Thus it would be practically
reasonable to have a prohibition
against making false promises.
Promises would then still be
made and still be believed.
However, the practical considerations concerning promises are their believability and the
consequences of the promise
not being fulfilled. If a promise
is believable, then the promisee
can act based on it, whether or
not it is a true or false promise.
Further, if a promisor suffers no

negative consequences for failing to fulfill a promise,26 then
the practical benefits of promises are not interrupted should
he or she make a false promise.
The promisor will still be believed in future acts of promising. For example, one could
make a false promise in complete confidence to a trusting
person on his or her deathbed.
The person would believe the
promisor and there would be no
negative consequences for this
false promise-maker when the
oath goes unfulfilled.
A rule allowing only false
promises that would be believed and that would lack negative consequences would be
equally practically reasonable
to a maxim prohibiting all false
promises. If one makes only
false promises of this kind, no
one would hold promises suspect and promises would still be
made. All rational agents could
make such promtses without
compromising the practicality
of promise-making, thus preserving universalizability of the
maxtm.
Consequently, when reason
is taken to have a practical consideration, there are at least two
possible rules concerning false
promises that could be universalized. One prohibits all false
promises. The other permits
only a certain kind of false
promise for the sake of practicality. Both rules could be fo llowed at all times and at all
places with practical success by

all rational agents. However, the
second and third formulas still
call for the general prohibition
of false promises. Thus, even
under a different interpretation
of the meaning of reason, the
categorical imperative can still
yield inconsistent rules to govern a single action. Even when
one considers practical reason,
one cannot necessarily know
which rule should be followed.

Reason, the basis of his moral
structure, has led to conflicting
rules with no way of determining which rule, if any, must be
followed Y

This is not to say, however,
that it is completely impossible
to base moral necessity in reason. It is possible that another
ethical system could accomplish this if it gave a moral law
from which only one set of morThe formula concerning au- al rules could be derived, thus
tonomy of persons and the for- clearly establishing that specific
mula concerning a kingdom of rules bind necessarily. Howevends always calls for a prohibi- er, Kant's system fails to do this,
tion against making any false largely because it has three difpromises. However, one can- ferent formulas of the categorinot derive that same rule with cal imperative as possible startsurety from the· formula of uni- ing points, multiplying the odds
versalizable maxims, regardless that rules conflict. This failure
of whether one interprets reason means that Kantian ethical systo mean pure logic or practical tems must be abandoned or sereason. Thus one cannot derive riously revised. Contemporary
all moral rules from any single philosophers cannot simply cite
formula. If one attempted to de- Kantian ideas verbatim, since
rive a body of rules from each their statements could harbor
formu la individually, the three unknown contradictions. A desets of maxims would differ ontological moral system might
and conflict. Since all three sets be preferable, but the Issues
would be derived from reason, inherent in the Kantian system
one could not rely on reason to leave a gap in ethical philosodecide which rules to follow; an phy. A new deontology is called
arbitrary or subjective choice for, one based on a single rule
would have to be made. Kant's that can avoid the contradicclaim is then suspect that all tions that come from multiple
three formulas are merely dif- basic rules.
ferent versions of the same law,
as reason then has not shown
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the Kantian system. Anscombe
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